Vicious cycle of alarmism could lead Israel into unwanted war with Iran

While neither side wants war, both Jerusalem and Tehran suspect each other of being ready to suddenly launch a surprise attack.

Neither Israel nor Iran wants war at this moment, nor do either of them want war for the foreseeable future.

Given that rare shared interest and outlook, one might think war between the sides would be unlikely.

That assumption would be false.

While neither side wants war, both suspect the other of being ready to suddenly launch a surprise attack.

Furthermore, both sides are unwilling at present to accept compromises that the other demands, which would openly distance them from the possibility of war.

The situation is so bad that, in a game of three dimensional chess and crazy mind-games, the side could even fall accidentally into a war if one side thinks that it unintentionally fooled the other into thinking it wants war, which could mean a preemptive strike to avoid a phantom, avoiding the idea that the other side might strike first when the whole conflict is in the mind of one side.

How did the situation get so unstable?

Iran and Israel were in a decades-long shadow war until April 2024.

In April 2024, Iran launched around 110 ballistic missiles, 170 drones, and over 30 cruise missiles at Israel, all in one night.

That permanently changed relations between the sides.

The Islamic Republic attacked again in October 2024 with over 180 ballistic missiles.

Israel counter-attacked both times for its part.

And then, at a moment of deep, if failed, nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran, the IDF launched its surprise attack on Iran in June.

‘Vicious cycle of alarmism’

From this point on, the Islamic Republic has become paranoid beyond reason for another such potential surprise attack, given that the Israeli attack caught it flatfooted, with deadly consequences for its national power and top commanders.

In response, Iran not only launched over 550 missiles and over 1,000 drones at Israel in real-time, but it is also hoping to build so many ballistic missiles that it will regain the 50% it lost six months ago, and then will far surpass the pre-war 2,500 missile total, such that it can overwhelm Israel’s missile shield.

No one expects Iran to attack now, given that it lacks sufficient missiles.

But might that make it more desirable for Israel to attack sooner?

And if Israel might attack sooner, then should Tehran attack sooner, even if it is not ready, since at least then it will not be caught by surprise again, as in June?

This returns the vicious circle of alarmism, which could lead to an unwanted war.

Such psychology almost led the world to a nuclear holocaust during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

In 2014, it led to a 50-day war between Hamas and the IDF that neither side wanted nor was ready for.

Of course, Hamas did want, and Iran does want, to eventually destroy Israel.

But that does not mean that it is smart to get into a war when Israel is not ready and recovered, whether in terms of hitting the volume of Arrow interceptors it would want to defend against a sustained Iranian missile campaign or in terms of Israeli society being ready to take another major hit from an enemy after there has been so little time to heel since the Gaza ceasefire kicked into effect in October.

Israeli officials have been leaking their readiness to strike Iran in order to try to deter it from rebuilding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

And if Iran keeps building up its ballistic missile volume, Israel may yet need to attack in three months, six months, or a few years.

Yet, in the meantime, Israeli officials are now concerned that they may have intimidated Iran to act aggressively, and are hoping that a recalibration can avoid war any earlier than actually necessary.